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Animals and Law in the American City
Irus Braverman

We must distinguish three kinds of animals. First, individuated animals, family pets,
sentimental, Oedipal animals each with its own petty history, “my” cat, “my” dog.
These animals invite us to regress, draw us into a narcissistic contemplation, and they
are the only kind of animal psychoanalysis understands, the better to discover a daddy, a
mommy, a little brother behind them . . . And then there is a second kind: animals with
characteristics or attributes, genus, classification, or State animals, animals as they are
treated in the great divine myths. . . . Finally, there are more demonic animals, pack or
affect animals that form a multiplicity, a becoming, a population, a tale.1

introduction
Modern western cities are designed by humans and with humans in mind;
indeed, nonhuman animals are conceived by many urban dwellers as being
“out of place.”2 However, a closer look at the contemporary city proves
otherwise. Humans are not the majority of the city’s members of Kingdom
Animalia. In fact, bees, pigeons, rats, bats, rabbits, ants, wasps, dogs, cats,
horses, chickens, bedbugs, and lice far outnumber humans. This nonhuman
animal population constitutes what has been referred to in animal studies
literature as a “shadow population” or a “subaltern animal town.”3
Whereas a large and growing literature is dedicated to studying human
populations in the city, not much has been written about nonhuman animals
in this space.4 This chapter will explore the presence of nonhuman animals in
the American city through a legal lens. In particular, it will address these
1

2

3

4

Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus 240–241 (Brian Massumi trans.,
1980).
Chris Philo & Chris Wilbert, Animal Spaces, Beastly Places: New Geographies of
Human Animal Relations (2000).
Jennifer Wolch, Kathleen West, & Thomas E. Gaines, Transspecies Urban Theory, 13 Env’t &
Planning D 735, 736 (1995).
Id. at 735.
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largely overlooked questions: On the one hand, how are animals constructed
by law and how does this construction translate into the animal’s material
existence in American cities? And on the other hand, how do humans and
animals work in and around the classifications constituted by animal laws?
I shall argue that alongside law’s attempt to classify animals, a considerable
administrative effort goes into keeping animals confined within their particular
classifications.
I will begin this chapter with a few general contemplations about the legal
classification of animals in American cities. I will then move to explore
specific legal categories of animals, especially in their urban manifestation:
domestic and companion animals, agriculture or livestock animals, wild ani
mals, and pests. In each category, instances of reclassification will demonstrate
the inherent messiness and fluidity of the legal ordering of animals as well as
the legal struggles to redefine such ordering. Finally, the context of bee laws
will provide ample ground to demonstrate how law’s classificatory schemes and
the human animal relations that ensue are performed in the American city.

classification in animal laws
The most prominent technology for regulating animals is their classification
into a set of legal categories. Such legal categories largely defer to the
Linnaean classification of Kingdom Animalia by phylum, class, order,
genus, and species.5 Alongside this system, however, law classifies animals
according to their relationship with humans. The vast majority of the animal
kingdom fall into one or more of the following legal categories: wild, domestic,
agriculture, pests, and laboratory animals, with each category representing a
particular human animal relationship. Legal categories for animals are not
always consistent, nor are they mutually exclusive. For example, a bee may be
desirable for humans as a pollinator and honey maker but undesirable and
thus unprotected when aggressive and stinging; and geese may be protected
when defined as wild animals but may not be protected when defined as
agricultural property to be raised and slaughtered, as game to be hunted, or as
a nuisance to be culled.
The level of legal protections granted to animals within their particular
categories and classifications also changes through time and place. For exam
ple, the American peregrine falcon was protected in 1970 through its listing as
an endangered wild species and was delisted from protection in 1999 after
5

See International Commission on Zoological Nomenclature, http://iczn.org/ (last
visited Feb. 17, 2013).

114

Braverman

what was deemed the population’s successful recovery. The particular ani
mal human exchange permitted by various laws also varies. City by city and
state by state, laws differ in terms of their prohibitions on keeping animals such
as honeybees, potbellied pigs, and exotic animals in the city. These examples
highlight the importance of categories and classifications for law’s perform
ances in the world. At the same time, they illuminate the challenges to law’s
categorical imperative, especially when the regulation of animals in the
American city is at stake.
Animal classifications can be characterized according to the level of legal
protection they grant from human inflicted harm.6 Every animal is either
protected or unprotected, this classification translating into a prescribed set
of legal actions humans may or may not perform with regard to humans,
animals, and habitat. For protected wild animals, “No person shall, at any
time of the year, pursue, take, wound or kill [them] in any manner, number
or quantity, except as permitted by . . . law.”7 Nor can any person “buy, sell,
offer or expose for sale, transport, or have in his possession any [animal]
protected by law.”8 By contrast, when classified as unprotected, animals are
subject to an array of additional laws that determine human behavior in
using, taking, or harming them (e.g., regulations over the extermination of
pests). Animal geography scholars Jody Emel and Jennifer Wolch observe
along these lines that invisible boundaries “historically divided the animal
world into those worth protecting because they were seen as either part of
nature (wildlife) or the human community (pets), and those not worth
protecting because they were neither (farm animals) and constituted sources
of profit and value.”9
In New York State, conservation laws govern myriad aspects of the animal
human relationships. A quick read of the following legal text already reveals
some of the major legal categories at work in this context:
5. a. “Unprotected wild birds” means the English sparrow and starling,
and also includes pigeons and psittacine birds existing in a wild state,
not domesticated.10
6

7
8
9

10

Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger; an Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and
Taboo (1966).
Application of Fish and Wildlife Law, N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 11–0107.
Id.
Jennifer R. Wolch & Jody Emel, Animal Geographies: Place, Politics, and Identity
in the Nature Culture Borderlands 14 (1998).
Bill number S1255 proposed an amendment to exclude the Monk Parakeet from “unprotected
birds” in order to protect feral breeding populations escaped from the exotic pet industry.
S1255–2011: Makes Monk (Quaker) Parakeets Protected Birds.
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b. “Protected birds” means all wild birds except those named in para
graph a of this subdivision.
6. a. “Wildlife” means wild game and all other animal life existing in a
wild state, except fish, shellfish and crustacea. . . .
e. “Wild animal” shall not include “companion animal” as defined in
section three hundred fifty of the Agriculture and Markets Law. Wild
animal includes, and is limited to, any or all of the following orders and
families: (1) Nonhuman primates and prosimians, (2) Felidae and all
hybrids thereof, with the exception of the species Felis catus (domes
ticated and feral cats, which shall mean domesticated cats that were
formerly owned and that have been abandoned and that are no longer
socialized, as well as offspring of such cats) and hybrids of Felis catus
that are registered by the American Cat Fanciers Association or the
International Cat Association provided that such cats be without any
wild felid parentage for a minimum of five generations, (3) Canidae
(with the exception of domesticated dogs and captive bred fennec foxes
(vulpes zerda)), (4) Ursidae, (5) All reptiles that are venomous by nature,
pursuant to department regulation, . . .
7. “Protected insect” means any insect with respect to the taking of which
restrictions are imposed by the Fish and Wildlife Law or regulations of
the department pursuant thereto.11
This legal text illustrates a few interrelated points. First, it demonstrates the
centrality of the terms “protected” and “unprotected.” Second, it introduces
a range of animal related classifications through which the animal world is
perceived and then ordered: “wild,” “companion,” and “insect,” as well as
“hybrids” and “feral.” Third, this text demonstrates law’s heavy reliance on
scientific distinctions, such as those between felines and canines (or “Felis
catus” and “canidae”) and, in particular, the contemporary importance of
genetic pedigrees (e.g., in the cat’s definition as going back for a minimum
of five generations).12 Finally, this text also exemplifies law’s desperate desire

11

12

Definitions, N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 11–0103 (McKinney 2011), available at http://codes.
lp.findlaw.com/nycode/ENV/11/1/11–0103. See also Utah’s definition of wildlife as: “(a) crustaceans, including brine shrimp and crayfish; (b) mollusks; and (c) vertebrate animals living in
nature, except feral animals.” Utah Code Ann. § 23–13–2 (West 2011).
This current reliance of law on genetic definitions seems to be a move away from Michel
Foucault’s reflections on animal classification as based on simple visible characteristics. In his
words, “The plant and the animal are seen not so much in their organic unity as by the visible
patterning of their organs. They are paws and hoofs, flowers and fruit, before being respiratory
systems or internal liquids.” Michel Foucault, The Order of Things 149 (1966).
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to organize things, alongside its anxiety about having an inherently limited
capacity to successfully define what is shifting and unstable by definition:
wildlife. In what follows, I will explore the central classifications of city
animals in contemporary American law. I shall begin close to home.

domestic animals, pets, and companion species
Historically, domestic animals were farm and working animals recognized as
having “intrinsic value” under common law.13 In the past, many courts refused
to expand the term “pets” to include cats, assuming that they had no intrinsic
value.14 Nowadays, the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) defines a pet as:
“[A]ny animal that has commonly been kept as a pet in family households in
the United States, such as dogs, cats, guinea pigs, rabbits, and hamsters. The
term ‘pet’ excludes exotic animals and wild animals.”15 In other words, a pet is
circularly defined by the CFR as an animal that has traditionally been a pet.
New York State regulations are clearer, but still quite broad, in their definition
of a pet as “any domestic animal that has been adapted or tamed to live in
intimate association with people but is not limited to dogs, cats, rodents, fish,
birds, snakes, turtles, lizards, frogs and rabbits.”16
Of all pets, only dogs must have a license in New York State. A human city
resident is allowed to hold up to four dogs, for example, but an infinite number
of cats. As principal objects of human care, dogs are also subject to regulations
that include matters such as proper shelter, restraints, licensing and identifi
cation, and medical treatments.17 Additionally, many states mandate rabies
vaccinations with accompanying fees and certification.18 Requirements for the
design of dog shelters serve as an example for the specificity of dog laws.
According to an Oklahoma statute, for example, dog breeders must provide at
least the following for an enclosure with one dog:

13
14

15
16
17

18

Animal Law, at 8.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Massini, 188 A.2d 816 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1963) (refusing to expand an
animal cruelty statute beyond the precise wording of the statute: “equine animal, bovine
animal, sheep, goat and pig”). See also Animal Law, id.
9 C.F.R. § 1.1.
N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 750-a (McKinney 2011).
See, e.g., Buffalo, N.Y. Code ch.78, art. III (1999) (providing detailed instructions about a
“public pound”, seizure, redemption periods and impoundment fees, adoption processes and
fees, and further licensing requirements). See also Irus Braverman, Legal Tails: Policing
American Cities through Animals, in Urban Policing, Securitization, and
Regulation (Randy K. Lippert & Kevin Walby eds., Routledge 2013), pp. 130–144.
See, e.g., S.C. Code Ann. § 47–5–60 (2011).
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The mathematical square of the sum of the length of the dog in inches
(measured from the tip of its nose to the base of its tail) plus 6 inches; divided
the product by 144, times 2. Mathematically, the space the commercial pet
breeder must provide for the first dog equals 2  [(length of dog in inches + 6) 
(length of dog in inches + 6)/144].19

Dog “disposal” is also heavily regulated, as federal norms define proper ways to
transport and sell dogs.20
In addition to dogs and cats, birds, reptiles, amphibians, and other animals
may be considered pets or, in the current fashion, “companion species.” For
example, a New York court recently held that a goldfish was a companion
animal under an anticruelty statute. In that case, a boy who owned a goldfish
regularly attended to it and even named it after himself.21 The animal was
thereby classified by the Court based on the human animal relationship
established in the particular case rather than by the independent identity of
the animals. Courts have also considered other circumstances, such as the
duration of the animal’s captivity, its training, and its behavior, to find that a
monkey was a domesticated pet, in the case of Rolling Meadows v. Kyle,22 but
that a pet monkey was a wild animal under a rabies control statute because
monkeys are not a “common domestic species,” in the case of Keeble v.
Cisneros.23
Although pets are not confined to city spaces, because they have flourished
in urban settings they are often seen as a quintessentially urban phenomenon.
The pets’ ownership and control by humans in the highly policed space of the
city, as well as their significant emotional role in the family, may serve to
explain why they are often subject to heightened regulation.24 For the most

19
20

21

22
23
24

Okla. Admin. Code § 532:15–3–3 (2011).
7 U.S.C.A. § 2131 (West 2011). The cremation of a dog in New York is considered a transaction
and regulated by the General Business Law. See N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law art. 35-C (McKinney
2011).
People v. Garcia, 812 N.Y.S.2d 66 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006). In this case, the Court considered the
scope of New York law for aggravated cruelty and its application to a pet goldfish. The dispute
turned on whether the goldfish was a “companion animal” under the statute to constitute a
felony. The defendant had stomped to death the pet goldfish of a nine-year-old boy, and the
Court found that child’s pet goldfish fell within the meaning of “companion animal” under the
statute, and thus the defendant was convicted of aggravated cruelty to animals in violation of
the Agriculture and Markets Law § 353a(1).
City of Rolling Meadows v. Kyle, 494 N.E.2d 766 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
Keeble v. Cisneros, 664 F.Supp. 1076 (Tex. 1987).
See, e.g., Andrea Hart Herbster, More than Pigs in a Parlor: An Exploration of the Relationship
Between the Law and Keeping Pigs as Pets, 86 Iowa L. Rev. 339 (2000); Rebecca J. Huss,
Separation, Custody, and Estate Planning Issues Relating to Companion Animals, 74 U. Colo.
L. Rev. 181 (2003).
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part, companion animals are policed through their human caregivers, or
“spokespersons.”25
The distinctions between “wild” and “domesticated” animals thus enable
and legitimize particular forms of human policing. Such forms of policing can
vary not only with regard to distinct species but also between two individuals
from the same species, as in the two cases involving pet monkeys mentioned
earlier. The fluidity of these categories entails that their regulation becomes
ever more complex.
Yet even at its very heart, the category of “pet” is not static. Pets may “jump”
categories based on their actions and the actions of their human caregivers.
For example, escaped pets are reclassified as “feral” or “stray” a particular
category of wild animals with a unique set of legal norms.26 Similarly, wild
animals may become pets through their training, as in the example of the
tamed monkey of Rolling Meadows v. Kyle. By acting as domestic and tame or
by escaping into the wild, pets effectively mobilize their legal classification
as companion animals to reclassify as feral or wild, and vice versa from
wild they become companion animals. Such physical trajectories that are
performed by animals, and the legal trajectories that ensue intersect, parallel,
and sometimes contradict human trajectories as humans capture, train, acci
dentally release, save, or kill an animal. These interactive human animal
trajectories and their regulation determine the relevant classifications that
apply in each case, their dynamics, and their policing powers.
Another classificatory scheme that facilitates the policing of nonhuman
(and human) animals in the American city is the distinction between pets and
livestock. For example, certain humans have taken to keeping Vietnamese
potbellied pigs as pets in their homes, a contested behavior in municipalities
25

26

The term “spokesperson” was coined by Actor Network Theorists to highlight how humans
have come to speak for nonhumans. See, e.g., Michel Callon, Some Elements of a Sociology of
Translation: Domestication of the Scallops and the Fishermen of St. Brieuc Bay, in Power,
action, and belief: a new sociology of knowledge? (John Law ed., 1986). For a
detailed exploration of how humans in American cities are policed through animals, see
Irus Braverman, Legal Tails: Policing American Cities through Animals, Urban Policing,
Securitization, and Regulation (Randy K. Lippert & Kevin Walby eds., Routledge
2013), pp. 130–144.
Alan M. Beck, The Ecology of Stray Dogs: A Study of Free Ranging Urban
Animals (1973); see also N.Y. Agric. & Mkts. Law, ch. 69, art. 5 § 74 (McKinney 2011) (defining
“feral” as an undomesticated or wild animal). Feral animals may include untamed buffalo, dogs,
horses, and the like that face starvation, infection, and attacks from other animals. Feral animals also
face eradication by humans through various techniques. The ASPCA defines “stray” as an animal
that has become lost or abandoned but is tame and comfortable around people. As such, stray
animals are more dependent on humans for survival than feral animals and are typically unable to
cope with life in the wild. See The American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty
to Animals (ASPCA), http://www.aspca.org (last visited Feb. 17, 2013).
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with zoning or public health codes against keeping livestock.27 The issue has
been resolved with different outcomes in different municipal jurisdictions. In
some cities, livestock is defined by its purpose for farming, therefore allowing
the keeping of pigs as pets. Other municipalities outlaw hogpens rather than
pigs, therefore allowing pigs in the house because it is clearly not a hogpen.
Finally, where pigs and pigsties are explicitly forbidden as nuisances in health
codes, no exception for pet pigs is permitted: in these municipalities a pig is a
pig always a forbidden nuisance. This example reiterates the commitments
humans make in their classification scheme and the impact that these classi
fications have on the mutual life of humans and animals in the American city.

agricultural animals or livestock
Whereas the boundaries between pet and livestock can often be blurry,
American laws take great pains to define and protect these classificatory
schemes so as to make them seem inevitable and even natural. For example,
Title 7 of the United States Code Annotated defines livestock as:
cattle, elk, reindeer, bison, horses, deer, sheep, goats, swine, poultry (including
egg producing poultry), fish used for food, and other animals designated
by the Secretary (at the Secretary’s sole discretion) that
(A) are part of a foundation herd (including producing dairy cattle) or
offspring; or
(B) are purchased as part of a normal operation and not to obtain
additional benefits under this subchapter.28

In Giles v. State,29 a New York court held that livestock are domesticated
animals that have become naturally harmless and docile through many years
of close contact with people. More generally, courts have distinguished this
state of agricultural domestication from a domestic pet whose principle role is
companionship.30 The domestic/domesticated distinction has been justified
as necessary for regulating livestock’s key role in farming and for ensuring
human health, public safety, and food security.31
27

28
29
30
31

This paragraph is drawn from Andrea Hart Herbster, More than Pigs in a Parlor: An Exploration
of the Relationship Between the Law and Keeping Pigs as Pets, 86 Iowa L. Rev. 339 (2000).
7 U.S.C.A. § 1471 (West 2011).
431 N.Y.S.2d 781 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1980).
Supra note 18.
However, some regulations are less clearly connected to health than others. For example, one
statute concerning bridge tolls states that, “Any toll gatherer . . . may stop any person with
automobiles, wagons, carts, or other vehicles . . ., and all horses, cows, cattle or other animal or
animals, from entering. . . until the toll herein provided for shall have been paid.” N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 27:19–29 (West 2011).
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Nonetheless, the distinction between domestic and domesticated did not
always exist as such. Preindustrial city dwellers used to put up with the
noise, odors, pestilence, and disease associated with livestock inside their
homes.32 With the technological advances and changes in urban design over
the last 150 years, horses have largely been replaced with trains and auto
mobiles, and slaughtering and preserving meat mostly occurs now outside of
the city, before it is brought into the urban market. Urban planners have
actively propelled this exodus of animals from the city. Land use regulations
and zoning policies have segregated agriculture from residential, commer
cial, and industrial activities. At the same time, animal control ordinances
have been established to regulate the care and keeping of livestock.
Generally prohibitive of many livestock activities, these new ordinances
have effectively banned all animal farming in towns.33 In the last decade,
the local foods movement has gained traction and urban agriculture is on
the rise. As a result, livestock is finding its way back into the city. Cities are
also increasingly heterogeneous and culturally diverse, thereby introducing
behaviors that sometimes conflict with American cities’ municipal codes on
livestock keeping and slaughtering. Regulations on permits and licenses
commonly situated in public health chapters or as a section of the animal
control chapter of municipal codes play a particularly important role in
prescribing how animals are to be treated, outlining specifications of enclo
sures and confinements, identifying agency or organizational oversight for
inspections, and listing other procedural and technical conditions that
must be met before livestock keeping is allowed.34 These regulations
have facilitated changes in what are considered to be legally acceptable
behaviors.
In a comprehensive study of communities residing in twenty two cities
across the United States, legal scholar William Butler found that although
most livestock keeping activities are limited to agricultural zones outside
cities, cities are increasingly allowing the keeping of chickens or bees even
within residential districts. Such an inclusion of bees and chickens in
urban space, Butler explains, is likely due to the fact that they have been
the most amenable animals in residential areas with fewest associated
nuisances35 Butler categorizes various localities based on their level
32

33
34
35

William H. Butler, Welcoming Animals Back to the City: Navigating Public Health Tensions of
Urban Livestock to Achieve Healthy and Resilient Communities, in Working Paper Series,
Fla. St. Univ. 3 (2011).
Id at 4. See also Carolyn Steel, Hungry City: How Food Shapes Our Lives (2009).
See supra note 35.
Butler, supra note 32, at 16.
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of restrictions on chicken populations via lot size, setbacks, and number
limitations:
Although some municipalities do not establish a maximum allowable num
ber of animals, some do limit the total number of animals allowed by each
property owner in the city. Ann Arbor only allows 4 chickens and 2 hives of
bees per property owner. Baltimore, MD allows no more than 4 chickens and
125 pigeons. The Kansas City, MO ordinance limits adult chickens and other
domestic fowl to 15, adult rabbits to 10, and larger livestock animals to 2.
Missoula, MT and South Portland, ME allow 6 chickens while Madison, WI
and Rogers, AK allow 4.36

Although chickens are increasingly allowed back into many American cities,
few cities have allowed roosters back in without significant restrictions. Butler
indicates, for example, that “in even some of the most permissible localities on
other issues, like King County, Washington, roosters are prohibited outright.”
In other cases, roosters are allowed with caveats. Cleveland allows roosters
but the code specifies that it is unlawful “to keep or allow to be kept any animal
or bird that makes noise so as to habitually disturb the peace and quiet of any
person in the vicinity of the premises.”37 Similarly, Stamford, Connecticut,
allows roosters but specifies that,
No person shall keep any rooster in such location that the crowing thereof
shall be annoying to any person occupying premises in the vicinity. Upon
complaint of any such person so annoyed, the Director of Health shall have
authority to order the owner of such rooster to remove the same so that such
annoyance shall cease.38

Butler concludes this discussion by anticipating that “mute roosters may soon
become popular in cities,” indicating, perhaps, the development of a legal
sensibility on the part of urban dwellers that might embrace biotechnological
artificiality in order to maintain its adherence to the letter of the law.39
Evidently, farm animals are subclassified and regulated according to their
use for humans (e.g., producing eggs) and their level of interference with
civilized urban life (e.g., crowing at inconvenient hours). They are then
prescribed a certain degree of legal protection, which differs both in text and
in institutional apparatus from the legal protections assigned to pets, pests, and
wild animals.

36
37
38
39

Id. at 23.
Cleveland, Ohio, Code ch. 347, § 347.02(g) (2010).
Id. at 25.
Id.
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wild animals
Whereas domestic animals are often perceived as quintessentially urban, wild
animals are seen as existing outside the city and thus as unaffected by its laws.
At the same time, the legal and physical barriers that prevent humans from
shifting their residency easily from one jurisdiction to another do not apply to
wild animals. Wild birds often migrate in and out of the city and wild insects
live in between these spaces. This section will demonstrate how animals travel
the urban wild divide and how law in turn regulates this mobility.40
As mentioned, New York State law defines wildlife as “all animal life
existing in a wild state.”41 The federal definition of “wildlife” in conservation
law refers to any “wild member of the animal kingdom whether alive or dead,
and regardless of whether the member was bred, hatched, or born in captivity,
including a part, product, egg, or offspring of the member.”42 A federal code
on endangered species defines, additionally, that endangered “fish or wildlife”
can be “any member of the animal kingdom, including without limitation any
mammal, fish, bird (including any migratory, nonmigratory, or endangered
bird for which protection is also afforded by treaty or other international
agreement), amphibian, reptile, mollusk, crustacean, arthropod or other
invertebrate, and includes any part, product, egg, or offspring thereof, or the
dead body or parts thereof.”43
The classification of an animal as wild carries with it a set of physical and
legal implications. A wild animal may receive more protections than a farm
animal, especially if it is also classified as endangered or threatened. Yet wild
animals commonly do not receive the same degree of protection as compan
ion animals under criminal anticruelty acts, even when they enter urban
spaces and homes.44
Many states and cities limit an individual’s ability to own a wild or exotic
animal. New York State code states, for example, that, “The State of New York
owns all fish, game, wildlife, shellfish, crustacea and protected insects in the
state, except those legally acquired and held in private ownership. Any person
who kills, takes or possesses such fish, game, wildlife, shellfish, crustacea or
protected insects thereby consents that title thereto shall remain in the state for
40

41
42
43
44

For a detailed discussion of animal mobility in the American city, see Irus Braverman, Animal
Mobilegalities: The Regulation of Animal Movement in the American City. Humanimalia 5(1):
104–135 (2013).
N.Y. Envtl. Conserv., ch. 43-B, art. 11 (1996).
16 U.S.C.A. § 668ee (West 2011).
16 U.S.C.A. § 1532 (West 2011).
Pamela Frasch, Kathy Hessler, Sarah Kutil, & Sonia Waisman, Animal Law in a Nutshell
10–11 (2011).
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the purpose of regulating and disposition.”45 In other words, even when wild
animals are on private property, they are generally defined as state property.46
Wild animals are also subject to report requirements. For example, New York
General Municipal Laws state that: “with the exception of pet dealers, every
person owning, possessing, or harboring a wild animal or a dangerous dog
within this state shall report the presence thereof to the clerk of the city, town,
or village in which such wild animal or dangerous dog is owned, possessed, or
harbored.”47
Although legal norms define certain animals as wild, the test for determin
ing their wildness remains unclear. American courts have inconsistently
applied different traits when considering the classification of nonhuman
animals as wild. For example, in State v. Mierz,48 the Washington Supreme
Court ruled that the statutory term “feral domestic mammals” refers to cats
and dogs that have escaped their owners, as opposed to wild animals such as
coyotes. Although to a casual observer a tamed coyote and a feral dog may
seem undistinguishable, the coyote’s wild origins and the dog’s domestic
origins were found to be crucial for triggering different legal classifications,
which then invoked a range of practical consequences. For example, the
Court held that although the feral dog may be kept as a pet, the possession
of the tame coyote was prohibited.49 New York courts approached the same
classifications differently. In a case from the 1800s, a New York court deter
mined that specific geese were tame and not wild because they were gentle,
would eat from one’s hand, and had lost the disposition to fly away.50 In a more
recent case that concerned a squirrel kept in captivity without a license, an
Ohio court found that the squirrel had already exceeded the natural life
expectancy of squirrels in the wild and was therefore no longer wild.51
Various courts have thus defined the term “wild” differently, triggering differ
ent courses of events (such as the prohibition from keeping certain animals
in a domesticated state or from releasing them into the wild) despite the
similarities between the animals involved. Another classification that
45
46

47
48

49

50
51

State Ownership and Control, N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 11–0105.
Wild animals that inhabit American zoos are an exception to the res commons ownership
category, as they are typically owned by the individual zoos. See Irus Braverman, Zooland:
The Institution of Captivity 137–139 (2012).
N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 209-cc (McKinney 2011).
State v. Mierz, 901 P.2d 286 (Wash. 1995). For a fuller discussion, see Frasch et al., Animal Law
in a Nutshell 10–11 (2011).
But see abovementioned discussion on City of Rolling Meadows v. Kyle, 494 N.E.2d 766 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1986).
Amory v. Flyn, 10 Johns. 102 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813) as quoted in id. at 11.
Division of Wildlife v. Clifton, 692 N.E.2d 253 (Ohio 1997), as quoted in id. 12.
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frequently overlaps that of wild animals and that is afforded heightened
significance in the city is that of “pests.”

pests
American Federal law defines the term “pest” as:
(1) any insect, rodent, nematode, fungus, weed, or (2) any other form of
terrestrial or aquatic plant or animal life or virus, bacteria, or other micro
organism (except viruses, bacteria, or other micro organisms on or in living
man or other living animals) which the Administrator [of the Environmental
Protection Agency] declares to be a pest.52

Similar to the definition of “pet,” a pest is defined as any organism that is
declared by the law as such. State laws generally follow the wording of the
federal model,53 although certain governmental agencies utilize a narrower
definition of the term. According to New York’s Agriculture and Markets
Law, for example, a pest is “any invertebrate animal, pathogen, parasitic
plant or similar or allied organism which can cause disease or damage in any
crops, trees, shrubs, grasses or other plants of substantial value.”54 A Florida
statute designates pests as “an arthropod, wood destroying organism, rodent,
or other obnoxious or undesirable living plant or animal organism,”55 whereas
an Arkansas ordinance grants cities and towns the authority to “prevent
injury or annoyance within the limits of the municipal corporation from
anything dangerous, offensive, or unhealthy and cause any nuisance to be
abated.”56
A pest is thus “a term that is nicely ambiguous in being simultaneously
technical and moral.”57 As illustrated in the language of the abovementioned
laws, the pest classification is founded on the human relationship to the animal
at stake as a nuisance, an annoyance, or as being altogether obnoxious. Many of
the everyday interactions between humans and animals that would render the
latter obnoxious occur in the space of the city. The definition of pests is, in
other words, highly relational; it is also very much culture, time, and site
specific. For example, whereas pigeons were once treasured for their cultural
52
53
54
55
56
57

7 U.S.C.A. § 136 (West 2011) (emphasis added).
E.g., N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 33–0101 (McKinney 2011).
N.Y. Agric. & Mkts. Law § 149 (McKinney 2011) (emphasis added).
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 482.021 (West 2011) (emphasis added).
Ark. Code Ann. § 14–54–103 (West 2011) (emphasis added).
Gary Alan Fine & Lazaros Christoforides, Dirty Birds, Filthy Immigrants, and the English
Sparrow War: Metaphorical Linkage in Constructing Social Problems, 14.4 Symbolic
Interaction 375, 375 (1991).
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value, they are increasingly regulated as “rats with wings.”58 Once a protected
wild species in New York State,
[T]he local legislative body of any city, town or village . . . may issue a permit
to any person to take pigeons at any time and in any humane manner in such
municipality, whenever [the legislature] finds that pigeons within such
municipality are or may become a menace to public health or a public
nuisance . . .59

The legal definition of an animal as a pest engenders a set of consequences in
the material world, and especially in the city. Of the various animal categories,
pests are probably afforded the weakest legal protections. They are “outlaws”
in the Agambenian sense: their bodies are banned and they may be killed by
anybody,60 or at least by licensed parties. A company for pest removal situated
in the City of Buffalo, New York, and entitled “Good Riddance,” assures
the public on its website that it will leave behind, “a safe, clean environment
free of odor and harmful bacteria,” promising that “whatever type of pest is
bothering you, . . . Good Riddance can deal with it, removing your problem
immediately.”61 The promotional materials of such companies depict an
environment with animal pests as hazardous, dirty, and harmful, packaging
such pests as a problem to be removed. Pest control and “removal” is thus
perceived as restoring the clean, sanitary, and safe urban environment.
Among the various subcategories of pests, the most outlawed are probably
those that humans have purposefully or inadvertently transported to a new
environment outside their natural range, also defined as “nonnative” or “alien”
species. When an alien species is classified as a pest that “does or is likely to cause
economic or environmental harm or harm to human health”62 it is further
subcategorized as an “invasive” species. Under the Lacey Act, if the species is
particularly harmful or injurious to “human beings; the interests of agriculture,
horticulture, forestry, or wildlife; or wildlife resources,” it is banned from
58

59
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Colin Jerolmack, How Pigeons Became Rats: The Cultural-Spatial Logic of Problem Animals,
55 Social Problems (2008). Jerolmack describes how pigeons were a bird admired and
hunted in New York in the early 1900s. In the 1940s and 1950s, pigeons were increasingly seen as
a nuisance and potential health threat, leading to bans on feeding pigeons and instances of
poisoning or shooting them. In the 1960s, two deaths were rhetorically linked to pigeons,
resulting in their renaming as “rats with wings” and in the public’s call for their extermination
in the city.
Pigeons, N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 11–0513.
Georgio Agamben, Homo Sacer. Sovereign Power and Bare Life (1998).
Good Riddance, Inc., available at http://www.goodriddanceinc.com/Pest-Control-BeesWasps-Hornets.aspx (last visited Oct. 7, 2011). The manager of this company refused to speak
with me.
Executive Order 13112, establishing the National Invasive Species Council, available at http://
www.invasivespeciesinfo.gov/laws/execorder.shtml.
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importation and violations can be punished by up to six months in prison and a
$5,000 fine.63
Unlike the designations of wild and domesticated, pests (and invasive pests
in particular) occupy specific moral valences. These serve to distinguish the
types of interactions between humans and animals that are typically termed
“nuisances” or “dangers” from interactions with certain acceptable animals,
such as cats, dogs, or even wild coyotes. Pests and invasive species present a
moral danger, not just a physical one: an unacceptable incursion into the
human world that threatens the urban way of life. By regulating these incur
sions in such a way that these animals are deemed “killable,” the law effec
tively places these animals outside of the law, in the Agambenian sense,
allowing, indeed prescribing, their extermination.

bee laws: to bee or not to bee?
Bees are an excellent example of the fluidity of legal classifications and their
translation into particular human animal relations in the American city. Bees are
uniquely mobile. They also pollinate 80 percent of the world’s plants, including
90 different food crops. This means that one out of every three or four human
bites of food is courtesy of a honeybee.64 Indeed, “[i]f the bee disappeared off the
surface of the globe, then man would have only four years of life left. No more
bees, no more pollination, no more plants, no more animals, no more man.”65
At the same time, humans also fear bees, and especially the African Killer
Bee. They also fear for their agriculture, as the recent Colony Collapse
Disorder has taken an increasing toll on this population.66 Humans thus
both fear the bee and depend on it for survival. This ambivalence translating
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64

65

66

U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Injurious Wildlife Factsheet, available at http://www.fws.gov/
fisheries/ans/pdf files/InjuriousWildlifeFactSheet2007.pdf (summarizing the Lacey Act, 18
U.S.C. 42; 50 CFR 16). Florida has the largest problem of invasive reptiles and amphibians
in the world. The introduction of new species – claimed to be largely a result of pet stores that
sell exotic animals – includes snails and snakes that pose a danger to the health and safety of
plants, animals, and humans. In reaction to this growing concern, Florida’s legislature enacted
laws prohibiting the introduction of nonnative reptiles and amphibians, and in fact banned
individuals from owning large reptiles. Bill Kaczor, Florida Has the Worst Invasive Reptile,
Amphibian Problem, The Gainesville Sun, Sep. 15, 2011. Also located at 9/15/11 AP Alert –
FL 21:35:51).
USDA: Honey Bee Research, available at http://www.ars.usda.gov/Research/docs.htm?
docid 11059 (last visited Oct. 18, 2013).
See Jimmy Lee Shreeve, Bee Decline Threatens Our Dinner and the Countryside, The
Telegraph, Aug. 3, 2007 (quoting Albert Einstein).
Alexei Barrionuevo, Honeybees Vanish, Leaving Keepers in Peril, New York Times, February
27, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/27/business/27bees.html (last viewed Oct. 21, 2011).
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into a complex set of legal norms and practices, some of which I will briefly
illustrate.
Like chickens, bees were historically excluded from many American cities
but are currently making their way back.67 The City of Buffalo, New York, is
an example of such current changes in public opinion that have called for the
bees’ reintroduction into the space of this city. Buffalo’s City Charter
Ordinance does not address bees or beekeeping; it addresses only cattle and
pigeons.68 Nonetheless, Buffalo’s municipal officials claim that urban bee
keeping is illegal because bees fall under the section of the ordinance that
addresses property maintenance. This section states: “[g]rounds, buildings and
structures shall be maintained free of insects, vermin and rodent harborage
and infestation.”69
Recently, local food initiatives and interested residents in Buffalo have been
fighting against the municipal interpretation of the charter and pushing
toward the legalization of bees in the city. One of the residents was quoted
saying that “[h]oneybees exist here already; they swarm here. I catch my
swarms in the city.” Others have emphasized that “[b]ees are a critical step
in urban food production.”70 Philip Barr is a Buffalo resident. He cultivated
bees until the winter of 2010, when he had to cease his practice because of the
City’s criminalization of beekeeping through its new interpretation of the
charter. Now Barr is working to promote the legalization of bees in the city,
arguing that beekeeping in the city is an important act of global conservation.
In his words,
Bees are at great risk and everybody could do something about the problem.
This is unlike dolphins, whales, or the white tiger of China, where few people
have resources and access to help solve the problem. When it comes to bees,
we cannot survive without bees, our economy depends on bees. So, everybody
67

68
69
70

The American Beekeeping Federation, Inc., is the beekeeping industry’s national organization.
Alongside this organization, a range of local beekeeping organizations has emerged – e.g., the
Back Yard Beekeepers Association and Backwards Beekeepers. See Backyard Beekeepers
Association: A Club for the Hobbyist Beekeeper, based in Southwestern
Connecticut, www.backyardbeekeepers.com (last visited Oct. 10, 2011) (providing information to the general public about honey bees and the how-tos of beekeeping, as well as the
benefits of bees and beekeeping in various communities); see also Backwards Beekeepers:
Backwards is the New Forwards!, www.backwardsbeekeepers.com (last visited Oct. 10,
2011) (a California-based organization promoting the reliance on “observation and natural
practices” to keep bees thriving, instead of the use of pesticides, chemicals, or other treatments
to control bee populations).
Buffalo, N.Y., Code ch.341, art. II § 341–348 (2001).
Id.
Anne Neville, Has the Time Arrived for Beehives in the City? The Buffalo News, Sept. 1,
2011.
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can have a beehive . . . If you outlaw bees in the city, you cut off a large
possibility for improvement.71

Atlanta, Georgia, has gone much farther than Buffalo in legalizing bees in
the city by actively promoting legal beekeeping. This approach has triggered
a myriad of legal stipulations. Under the Georgia Code, bees are classified as
agricultural products.72 The code also prescribes licenses for the sale of bees,
prohibitions against any restrictions of honeybee production, and regulation
regarding the importation of honeybees.73 The code establishes, along these
lines, that “no county, municipal corporation, consolidated government, or
other political subdivision of this state shall adopt or continue in effect any
ordinance, rule, regulation, or resolution prohibiting, impeding, or restrict
ing the establishment or maintenance of honeybees in hives.”74 Georgia law
also establishes that “inspections will be made by the agricultural commis
sioner to ensure the combating and spread of bee diseases, Africanized
bees, or any other threat to honeybees throughout the state.” Finally,
Georgia law states “that any bees or fixtures are infected with any contagious
or infectious disease or that such bees or fixtures have been exposed to danger
of infection by such diseases, that any honeybees have become Africanized,
or that honeybees are confronted with any other threat in this state, the
Commissioner may require the destruction, treatment, or disinfection of
any such infected or exposed bees, hives, fixtures, or appliances.”75 In other
words, beehives in Georgia are subject to inspection and any hive exhibiting
signs of aggressive Africanized bees or infection with Colony Collapse
Disorder is targeted for extinction.
Historically, Africanized honeybees, colloquially termed “killer bees,” are a
strain of bees that were bred in Brazil in the 1950s as a cross between African
71
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Telephone Interview with Philip Barr, in Buffalo, N.Y. (Oct. 2, 2011).
Ga. Code Ann. § 2–7–92 (13), § 2–10–81 (West 2011).
Ga. Code Ann. § 2–14–40 – 47 (West 1982).
In Georgia, inspection is done by the Commissioner of Agriculture. Anyone wishing to sell
bees must acquire a license and pay a fee of $25.00. Ga. Code Ann. § 2–14–40 (West 2011). For
example, section 2–14–43 of the Code provides for the inspection of honeybee colonies:
The Commissioner may require the registration and inspection of honeybee colonies as
needed. Such inspections shall be made for the primary purpose of combating the spread
of bee diseases, Africanized bees, or any other threat to the honeybees in the state. All
persons subject to this article shall be provided reasonable opportunity to assist the
inspectors in the inspection of such colonies.
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Honeybees are further addressed in Georgia Law under the title “Property”, which provides that
honey deposited by bees in a tree shall belong to the owner of the tree even if the bees were
hived by another person. Ga. Code Ann. § 44–1–9 (West 2011).
Ga. Code Ann. § 2–14–43, § 21–14–44 (West 2011).
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and European honeybees. They were hybridized to increase honey production
in tropical conditions. As a result of their accidental release into the wild,76
Africanized honeybees spread as far north as Texas, causing much panic along
the way. They have come by their “killer” moniker because they will “viciously
attack people or animals that unintentionally stray into their territory.”77
The USDA recently defined killer bees as an “invasive species,”78 a
definition that has in turn triggered a set of effects on their legal and
material state in American cities. Whereas the European bee is defined
as naturalized,79 gentle, civilized, and even essential to humans, the
Africanized bee is defined as invasive, dangerous, and even deadly.80
Consequently, while European honeybees are afforded myriad legal pro
tections, Africanized bees not only lack such protection but are also targeted
for extermination.81 In between these extreme states, wild bees that do not
76
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See The Free Dictionary, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/Africanized+honey+bee (last
visited Oct. 7, 2011).
See Killer Bee Africanized Honey Bees Bee Attacks in Arizona, http://phoenix.
about.com/cs/desert/a/killerbees01.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2013).
See USDA: NATIONAL Invasive Species INFORMATION CENTER: Africanized
Honeybee (apis mellifera scutellata), http://www.invasivespeciesinfo.gov/animals/afrhonbee.shtml (last visited Oct. 18, 2013).
The term “naturalized” is used here in the ecological sense as an exotic species that is
introduced in a new environment and sustains itself by reproduction but also recalls the
“naturalization” of foreign residents when they gain citizenship in their new country.
Although it is also geographically descriptive, the use of the term “Africanized” to name this
bee is also highly racial and an instance in which animals serve as displacements of human
fears. The bee is defined as aggressive and uncivilized, in relation to the civilized and gentle
European honeybees. Fears of dark Africa and death are projected onto this animal, which has
probably not caused more deaths than its “gentler” European counterpart. See Bayard Webster,
“Killer Bees” Approaching U.S. Revive Crop Fears, N.Y. Times, Jul. 13, 1982 (describing some
of the origins of the Africanized bee fears). Gary Alan Fine and Lazaros Christoforides study
another instance in which animals serve as displacements of human fears. Their study focuses
on the “Great English Sparrow War,” a moniker that refers to the diffusion of English sparrows
into North America in the second half of the nineteenth century and the role of metaphor in
the construction of social problems. The authors suggest that “The nativism evident in the
reaction to immigrant laborers was equally evident in a biological nativism which turned its
hostility to these birds who found American soil so much to their liking.” See Gary Alan Fine
and Lazaros Christoforides, Dirty Birds, Filthy Immigrants, and the English Sparrow War:
Metaphorical Linkage in Constructing Social Problems, 14 Symbolic Interaction 375, 377
(1991). The following clarification is also relevant in the Africanized bees context: “Our claim is
not that the proponents of attacks on sparrows cynically manipulated nativist rhetoric in order
to inflame passions, but rather this set of nativist beliefs made sense in explaining the dangers of
a foreign interloper to the community of American birds.” Id.
And yet, European honeybees are not native to North America. In the words of beekeeper
Philip Barr, “honeybees are not native to this country. So, since the time that they were brought
by the Europeans, they have been selectively bred and managed. However, the more feral the
hive evolves, the more that the domesticated traits fade.” See supra note 95.
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serve humans for the mass production of honey are not afforded legal
protection under many statutes.82
Honeybees have been categorized under nearly every animal classification.
Any given hive may be defined as either domestic or wild, depending on
whether it is managed by a beekeeper. It may also “jump” between categories
by absconding or swarming away from its hive or by caught from the wild by a
beekeeper. Whereas some honeybees are part of the Lacey Act’s list of inju
rious invasive species, others function like domestic farm animals.
The mobility of honeybees has resulted in the mobilization of various legal
classifications in order to protect humans from this insect; at the same time,
because humans also depend on the bee, legal classifications have also been
established to protect bees from humans.

conclusion
This chapter has skimmed through a variety of animal laws and regulations
that pertain to urban animals in the United States. Specifically, I have
explored how laws attempt to sort animals into rigid classifications such
as domestic and companion, agriculture and livestock, wild, and pest ani
mals and how these different classes of animals are then subject to complex
regulatory schemes that afford varying degrees of protection from human
conduct.
Alongside the attempted rigidity of legal regimes on animals, this chapter
has shown that fluidity and mobility are crucial aspects of the legal ordering of
human animal relations, especially as these relations manifest in the humanly
dense space of the city. The honeybee in particular has served to demonstrate
how animals are subject to, and themselves affect, legal and administrative
practices.
Levels of animal rigidity and mobility also vary with respect to
the treatment of the same species under parallel laws. Indeed, states and
82

See Beesource Beekeeping: Laws Relative to Bees and Beekeeping, http://www.
beesource.com/resources/elements-of-beekeeping/laws-related-to-bees-and beekeeping/ (last
visited Oct. 11, 2011). Ironically, the solution in Brazil has been to retame the Africanized
honeybee by culling the queens of aggressive hives and breeding more docile African queen
bees. In the United States, scientists advise beekeepers to use the same method of culling
aggressive hives and actively breeding docile hives. See E. H. Erickson, B. J. Erickson,
H. H. Laidlaw, & L. Moore, Preparing for the “Africanized” Honey Bee: A Program for
Arizona, http://www.beesource.com/point-of-view/africanized-honey-bees/preparing-for-theafricanized-honey-bee-a-program-for-arizona/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2011). Since the bees are
visually indistinguishable, beekeepers must judge each hive, European, African, or hybrid,
by its behavior.
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municipalities use different categories to refer to identical species, resulting
in that a particular species is defined differently under different laws.83 For
example, a pig or a horse may be defined as a companion animal under
anticruelty provisions and as livestock under provisions regulating agribusi
ness. Legislatures may also reclassify animals within the same laws at
different times. In Missouri, for example, ostriches were reclassified from
exotic animals to livestock,84 and numerous examples exist of “listing” and
“delisting” animals into and out of their designation as “wild” and “endan
gered” by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.85
In contrast to the legal mobility of potbellied pigs between categories of
livestock and pet, the New York State conservation law requires the killing
of any domestic dog that hunts a deer and of any wild coyote that kills a
domestic animal. Such instances demonstrate the intolerance of law
toward the mobility of dogs and coyotes between the legal categories of
domestic and wild. Particular reclassifications have been established to
manage such transgression: a domestic dog that kills a deer does not
become a protected wild animal but instead a feral dog; a wild coyote
that kills a pet becomes a nuisance coyote, categorically different from a
wild animal with protections. As a result of law’s heightened regulation of
animal mobility in such cases, the feral dog and the nuisance coyote may
both be killed. The execution powers are reserved to the sovereign, here
in the form of government officials who are authorized to reorder the
domestic wild boundary.
Alongside law’s attempt to classify animals, a considerable effort also goes
into keeping animals confined within their particular classificatory spaces.
The prohibitions from keeping wild and farm animals as pets and those that
prohibit treating pets as pests or pests as pets all point to the desire of law
makers to keep animals under the tight controls and within the rigid confines
of their static classifications so as to keep cities safe, sanitized, and free of
animal nuisances.
At the same time, human and nonhuman animals also express their own,
sometimes conflicting, trajectories that often transgress and challenge their
fixity within the legal categories, forcing lawmakers and enforcers to adapt or
83
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Animal L., at 7.
Id. See also Levine v. Conner, 540 F.Supp.2d 1113, 1116 (N.D. Cal. 2008). There, the court
analyzed the dictionary definition of the term “livestock” and observed that “the scope of
domestic animals used or raised on a farm can potentially extend to guinea pigs, cats, dogs, fish,
ants, and bees.”
See, e.g., U.S. Fish and Wildlife Endangered Species Bulletin at http://www.fws.gov/endangered/news/bulletin.html (last viewed June 16, 2013).
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develop new ways of regulating disorderly natures so as to redefine, reestablish,
and reinforce order. My reading in this chapter thus illuminates how legal
regimes accompany, dictate, and respond to human animal coexistence in
the city and how such legalities both translate and reflect human animal
practices and materialities in the city.

